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ABSTRACT
Brazil, Argentina and Israel all used price controls as part of
disinflation programs in 1985—1986. In each case they were intended to break
an "inertial" component of inflation. This paper focuses on a specific
mechanism through which inflation inertia can emerge: the interaction between
lack of credibility of government monetary policy announcements and the price
setting behavior of forward looking firms. We show that this interaction can
lead to inertia extending well beyond the price setting period; that is
important since the price setting period is likely to be short in high
inflation economies.
Wedevelop an open economy macromodel in which firms set prices
before uncertainty about government monetary policy is resolved. Lack of
credibilityis then shown to lead to output losses during a disinflation
program. We demonstrate the effects of price controls and show that their
temporary use can be defended on welfare grounds. The paper analyzes asset
price behavior during disinflation programs with and without price controls
and the influence of credibility problems. We discuss nominal and real
interest rates, the stock market and exchange rates. Finally we show that if
past government policy has any information content about future government
policy, cheating on current announcements of tight policy buys current
employment gainsduring the price control period at the cost of higher
inflation afterwards. Sustaining low inflation afterthe price control period
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Brazil, Argentina and Israel all used price controls as part of
highly visible disinflation programs in 1985—1986. The controls were intended
to break an "inertial" component of inflation, and hence planned as temporary
measures. Like previous experiences with price controls, the result to date
have been mixed. Israel has succeeded in lifting most of them without
triggering a resurgence of inflation; Brazil and Argentina failed in repeated
attempts to do likewise. This experience raises many questions to which the
existing literature does not provide an answer. It is clear there are
microeconomic costs, but what are the macroeconomic benefits, if any? Under
which circumstances do price controls help in bringing down inflation and when
do they just suppress it temporarily? How should they be set up? And taken
off? What is the proper supporting role of fiscal and monetary policy during
the period controls are in force?
The literature on price controls is very scant. Possen (1978)
superimposes wage—price controls on a standard model with competitive behavior
by each actor, and adaptive expectations. Blejer and Liviatan (1987) use a
similar set up, but with inflation itself adjusting only slowly ("core
inflation" moves gradually) and argue controls substitute for the need for
restrictive demand management during the transition period towards lower
inflation.
Both papers exogenously introduce some form of inertia in the
inflationary process, in line with most policy makers' rationale for the use
of such controls (cf Arida—Lara Resende (1985)). The concept of inflation
inertia and its connotation of price setting behavior naturally leads to the
question of whether one should consider non—competitive market structures in
analyzing the effects of price controls. Helpman (1986) provides evidenceSV—046/SVD/05—21—87 —2—
thatthis should indeed be done. He analyzes the output and trade balance
response to price controls, first under the assumption of competitive markets
and then under the assumption of monopolistic market structures. He
demonstrates that the actual output response in Brazil and Israel is at
variance with the predictions of the competitive model, but seems to accord
well with what comes out of the non—competitive model. Dornbusch and Simonsen
(1986) and Simonsen (1986) also assume non—competitive markets. They explain
inflation inertia as a consequence of coordination failure between wage and
price setters in the economy after an observed change in monetary policy. The
role of wage—price controls is clear in such a world: the government through
such controls resolves the coordination failure.
This paper also focuses on the role of price inertia. Like Dornbusch
and Simonsen (1986) and Simonsen (1986), we do not assume inertia
exogenously. However we will focus on a different mechanism through which
inflation inertia emerges: the interaction between lack of credibility of
government monetary policy announcements and the price setting behavior of
forward looking firms. We show that this interaction can lead to inertia
extending well beyond the price setting period; that is important since the
price setting period is likely to be short in high inflation economies. In
Section 2, the paper develops an open economy macromodel (a variant of the one
introduced in Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1986,1987)) in which firms set
prices before uncertainty about government monetary policy is resolved. Money
demand is based on interest sensitive cash—in—advance requirements like in
Lucas (1982) and, especially, Svensson (1985, 1986). Consumers have rational
expectations and use intertemporal welfare optimization to decide on
consumption patterns, savings rate and portfolio allocation. We use the
capital asset pricing model to work out asset prices and interest rates.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —3—
Themodel is used in Section 3 to show how lack of credibility can
lead to output losses during a disinflation program. We demonstrate the
effects of price controls and show that their temporary use can in fact be
defended on welfare grounds. Section 4 analyzes asset prices during the
control period, and the influence of credibility problems. We discuss nominal
and real interest rates, the stock market and exchange rates. We finally
address the question of the appropriate stance of monetary policy during the
price controls. We show that, if past government policy has any information
content about future government policy, cheating on current announcements of
tight policy buys current employment gains during the price control period at
the cost of higher inflation afterwards. Sustaining low inflation after the




There are two countries, home and foreign. Each country is
completely specialized in the production of home and foreign goods,
respectively. There is production of differentiated products, but at this
stage it is sufficient to consider two aggregate goods only. In period t (t =
—1,0,1, ...)worldper capita production of each good, Y and
respectively, is costless up to an exogenous stochastic capacity level,
and t.Whenoutput falls short of capacity, there is underutilization of
resources. V
1! Underutilizationof resources can be interpreted as unemployment under
some simple labor market assumptions (for example fixed coefficients in
production and a fixed labour supply).SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —4—
The(worLd per capita) supply of home and foreign currency in period
t, M and Nt, respectively, is given by
(2.1) =wM1
and 11* =w*N*11.
w (w*) is the gross rate monetary expansion of home and (foreign) currency.
y, y* and at are serially independently distributed. Their
probability distributions are the time—invariant functions F(y)i Ft(y)
and 11*. There are only two possible values for w: a high expansionary value,
and a low value w's distribution function, H, then takes the
following form:
0 Oi<WL
(2.2) H (cii)= 1'HWL
cii C
1
The home and the foreign consumer have identical preferences:
(2.3)
EtZ_tBttu(cht, Cf),0< s 1.
Et is the expectations operator conditional upon information available in
period t; u(cht, cf) is a standard concave instantaneous utility function of
consumption ch and cf of home and foreign goods, respectively, in period t.
The home consumer enters period t with stocks of six different
assets: home and foreign currency, Mt_i andNt_I, shares in home and foreign
firms, Zht_1 and zft_1 and claims to transfers of home and foreigncurrency,
xM_1 andSV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —5—
Inthe beginning of the period the consumer Learns current capacities
and monetary expansions. After that, the goods market opens. On the goods
market the consumer can buy home and foreign goods. He must pay for home
goods with home currency and for foreign goods with foreign currency. J
Hencehe faces the liquidity constraints
(2.4a) Phch ￿ Mt_i + (w —1) Mt_ix.rt_i and
(2.4b)PIcf + (w* -1) 1*
Sincenominal goods prices are sticky and do not adjust to the
current state of the market, there will be excess demand in some states and
excess supply in others. When there is excess demand consumers will be
rationed. Thus the home consumer also faces the rationing constraints. 2/
(2.5) ch￿Y and
After the consumer's transactions on the goods market, that market
closes and the asset market opens. On the asset market, dividends on shares
are distributed, and the consumer can trade assets and liabilities according
to the budget constraint:
1/ In the terminology of Helpman and Razin (1984), this is the S—system,
where the sellers nationality determines the transactions currency. They
also consider the B—system, where the nationality of the buyer determines
the transactions currency.
2/ We exploit that in equilibrium either none or both consumers will be
rationed, and we assume that in the latter case they receive identical
rations.SV—046/SVD/OS—27—87 —6—
(2.6) Mt + eN + Qhzh + Qftzft + i4 'N + ltN 'N
+(w —1) Mt_i 'Nt—i — Phtcht]
+
+ (w —i) ':XE_i]+ ht + hJt Zht_i+
(Qf + eP!Y) Zfti
+
R 'N—1 + RftxNt_i•
e is the exchange rate, ht and ft arethe home currency prices ofcLaimsto
transfersof home and foreign currency respectively. After these transactions
the asset market closes, and the home consumer leaves period t and enters
period t+l with new stocks of his six assets and liabilities, N, NtJ Zht
Zft, 'ht and 'ft•
The home consumer will maximize expected utility (2.3) subject to the
sequence of Liquidity, rationing and budget constraints (2.4)(2.6). The
foreign consumer will maximize the same utility function, with the same
constraints, only his variables are denoted by "p',like ct M, N.





subject to the constraints (2.4—b). v is a value function and s the state
vector (y, y, w, w). w is wealth inclusive asset returns at the time
asset markets are open.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —7—
Beforedescribing the solution, consider the pricing problem of
firms. Home (foreign) firms produce differentiated home (foreign) goods in
monopolistic competition along the lines of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). They
set prices in their own currency, and, for some reason left unspecified, must
do so before the current values of w*, y,y* and, in the case of uncertainty
about w, w are known. Hence own—currency goods pricesht÷l and will
depend on period t information only. For convenience we use the inverse price
level, M = andir=l/P.Firms set prices such as to maximize their
stock market value; the solution to this price setting problem is given in
Appendix B. Absence of money illusion and of serial correlation in the




withk, k* independent of period t+l actual output (See Appendix B for the
determination of k and k*). A subscript E refers to expected value and primes
to variables in period t+l.
We consider a perfectly pooled equilibrium, where the home and
foreign consumer hold identical portfolios and consume identical quantitities
of the goods. Thus the market equilibrium conditions for the goods, money and




(2.9b) Mt =M=' N== N*,andSV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —8—
(2.9d) =Zft
= = = = Xf= = = 1.
Equilibrium first of all requires all liquidity and goods market constraints
to be satisfied, so:
(2.lOa) Ch ￿ kzzsIw6 = ￿ 0],
(2.lob) ￿ 7 [Vh ￿ 01,
(2.lOa) uses (2.5a), (2.8) and the equilibrium conditions (A.1) (cf Appendix
A.l). and Vh are the Lagrange multipliers of the liquidity and capacity
constraints respectively. Furthermore, the marginal utility of home goods
equals the marginal utility of wealth in terms of home goods U), unless
binding liquidity constraints (uh > 0) or capacity limits (vh > 0) drive a
wedge between the two:
(2.lOc) uh(ch, Cf) =
A+ +
The marginal utility of wealth measured in home goods, A depends
only on home monetary expansion. From the asset pricing equation for claims







Themultiplicative term (WE/w) drops out in the absence of expectational
errors. The impact of such errors is obvious:
ax
a(WEIW)
Overestimating money growth increases the marginal utility of wealth. This is
because overestimating money growth leads to unanticipated tightmoney, and
lower prices tomorrow thanpreviouslyanticipated. But lowerpricestomorrow
for given prices today raise the marginal utility ofa nominal unit of wealth,
AIMS since it coimnands more resources tomorrow. Since iispredetermined,
A goes up as a consequence.
A set of expressions similar to 2.10 holds for foreign variables.
The variables and equations can be decomposed into twogroups, one
corresponding to home and one to foreign variables. Front (2.10) we can solve
for the endogenous variablesch, A, uh and as functions of y, w, and w,
and consumption of foreign goodscf. From the corresponding equations for
* * * * foreign variables we can solve forcf, Xf hf and Vf as functions of y
* *1
andcf.
Finally we need to address the way firms form expectations about
future monetary policy. In Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1987) current shocks
contain no information value about future shocks. Here we want to focuson
disinflation programs: after a period of high inflation and highmoney growth
(w =wa),the government announces restrictivemoney growth targets
(w =
WL)at the time firms need to make pricing decisions. We will explore
the case of complete credibility and the case of incompletecredibility. The
latter implies that firms assign a positive probabilityy to the possibilitySV—0461SVD/O5—27—87 — 10—
ofexpansionary money (w =aff)in spite of the announcement of tight money
The formation of could be based on Kreps—Wilson (1982) type
Bayesian updating formulas (see Backus and Driffil (l985a,b) for an
example). Alternatively, a signaling equilibrium might exist where a
government, by appropriately low choice of u)L can make sure that the
historicaLly inherited value ofTH (applied to period t) will switch to 0 or 1
depending on the monetary policy followed during the price control period:
see Persson and van Wijnbergen (1987) for such an approach. In this paper we
are concerned more with the consequences of credibiLity problems rather than
their cause; we therefore simply adopt the Persson—van Wijnbergen (1987)
setup. therefore has a value determined by past history. Beliefs about
the post—control period (y) will then depend on whether actual monetary.
policy during the controls coincides with the announcement of tight policy
(IlLornot. Existence of such a signaling equilibrium requires that is low
enough to make it optimal for the expansionary government not to follow it, in
spite of the credibility gains it would get by doing so; but high enough to
not make it too costly for the "tight" government to use10L as signal
(Persson and van Wijnbergen (1987))].
2.2 Interest and Exchange Rate Determination
One over one plus the nominal interest rate equals the present value,
measured in money terms, of a sure unit of nominal money paid out next period
(after goods markets close; bonds yield no liquidity services):
(2.12a) 1/(l+i) =
BEA'w'M/(AJM)
or i =E1iT/(EX'1r4)SV—046/SVDIO5—27—87 —11—
Thesecond equality is derived using equation (A.3d).
The nominal interest rate hence equals the ratio between expected future
liquidity services of money, Epw, and the expected utility of future nominal
wealth, EA'ic. The interpretation is straightforward: both money and a
nominal bond have an end of period value equal to one unit of money. During
the holding period, money alone yields liquidity services, valued atEut.
To offset that advantage, bonds need to pay interest of equal value, so market
clearing requires iEX'ir1 =Euh1r,which yields (2.12). Similar expressions
hold for i. Note in particular that current prices(tiN) do not influence i.
Real rates can be derived from the present value of a future unit of
wealth measured in terms of home (foreign) goods to derive the own rate of
interest for home (foreign) goods:
(2.13) l/(l+r) =BEX'/x;1/(1+r*) =$EX*hIX*
Consider finally exchange rates. Most high inflation countries that
went through a disinflation programs used some form of nominal exchange rate
fixing, at least initially (Bolivia 1986 is an exception). However, those
countries also has extensive black markets in which foreign assets were traded
freely. We therefore assume a floating rate system; the emprirical
counterpart of the exchange rate is thus the black market rate.Y
!'Tocompletely dismiss the official rate as an inframarginal set of trade
taxes and subsidies with no real impact other than distributional is
clearly overly simplistic. An analysis of dual exchange rate systems
would however be outside the scope of this paper. Kiguel and Lizondo
(1986) provide a recent survey.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —12—
Thenominal exchange rate in asset markets is the rate at which a
domestic currency denominated nominal unit of wealth can be exchanged for a





However, since liquidity and capacity constraints may drive a wedge
between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal utility of
wealth, this is not necessarily the exchange rate that would obtain if markets
for domestic and foreign money would be open during the goods market.!' If
such markets would open up, it is easy to show that the following would hold






2.3 A Simple Graphical Representation
The "ex post" equilibrium can fall in either one of three regimes for
each country's commodity market,a' depending on the realization of capacity
and monetary expansions. In the first regime, the capacity constraint is
1/ Svensson (1985), section 5, extensively discusses different exchange rates
concepts in the context of a similar model.










Uh Cy, Cf) = A+
0
> A=A =
because the signaling equilibrium implies w' =to. XEk/WE by definition.
This is regime F in fig. 1; (2.16—17) imply it is to the NW of Winfig. 1.
S.
Figure 1: The Three Different Regimes in Home Markets
When liquidity constraints are binding, there is excesscapacity and hence









so this regime, labeled L in figure 1, is to the NE of W in fig. 1.
In the third regime, there is excess capacity AND excess liquidity,







In this regime, labeled U in fig. 1, there isa true effective demand failure:
neither capacity nor liquidity constraints are binding. Thishappens if
monetary policy is very restrictive (a low). Thus inflationary expectations
are low and the return on money commensurately high. This regime is to the SE
of W in fig. 1. Svensson (1986) shows that thisregime will never obtain if
a is knowntofirms when they set prices for the next period.
3. Price Controls, Credibility and the Output Costs of DisinflationPrograms
We will use the machinery developed in section 2 toanalyze the
employment costs of disinflation programs, the impact of credibility problems
and the role for price controls. Consider aneconomy where the price level
and the money stock have been growing at a high ratew. Then, at the end of
period t—1, the government announces a disinflationprogram that relies on a
reduction in the growth rate ofmoney, down to a low rate The impact of
credibility works through firms' price setting behavior. Thegovernment
either follows its announcement, so is actually realized, or it reneges onSV—046/SVDIO5—27—87 — 15 —
its announcement. For simplicity we assume that in that case the pre—
announcement high money growth rate is implemented. The firms' assess-
ment of the probability that this happens isH Expected money growth is
(3.1) WE = TH WH + (li) WL
The impact of credibility can then be assessed by comparing the case of
a 0 with what happens whenTH >0.
Consider the case of = 0 first. Then the government announcement
is believed; assume the government aLso follows through. HenceWE a
This is equivalent to case where firms actually knowmonetary policy before
setting prices; hence, as shown in section 2 no real variables will be
affected by the slowdown in money growth. Firms will offset thedrop in w by
an increase in K (fall in future prices). In terms of the diagram, the







ti1uis 2.A CFIdISLI RSdUCtQn InMoneyCrovcnSV—046/svD/05—27—87 —16—
Withfull credibility, a monetary slowdown wiLl therefore haveno
more expected output losses than would have obtained otherwise, in spite of
the presence of monopolistic firms. Private welfare is alsounaffected:
F (K.nw)




.1J u(Kw ,c)dF(y)dF*(y*) dH*(cth*)
F(K.gO3u)s
F (K.bwL)






since = inthe absence of expectational errors. S is shorthand for
the domain of y* and csi.Price setting and monopolistic competition in
themselves can clearly not explain theoutput costs of disinflation programs.
Consider however the case of incompletecredibility, tH > 0.In
Appendix B, we show that, under the additionalassumption of a uniform
capacity distribution, firms will set prices as ifWE =YHWL+ (1_YH)WL
will obtain with certainty. See fig. 3.
Comparison with figure 2 shows the problem a lack ofcredibility
causes. As long as > 0, firms set prices as if rather than would
obtain:
(3.4) < K=> E >SV—O46ISVD/05—27—87 — 17 —
Hence if the government does follow a tight policy, w =UtLP liquidity
constraints start binding at rather than TFE' with
(3.5) 7FE — = KEY11(w11 —
The probability of unemployment,Pro,clearly rises:
KEYH(wa —rJJL)/ ;; >o
So the probability of unemployment goes up more, the Larger the cut inmoney
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governmentnot following its announcements, The basic problem is
straightforward: lack of credibility causes the real money stock to be "too
low" on the transition path between the policy announcement and the period at
which government credibility is established. It is the interaction between
monopolistic price setting and credibility that causes the output losses
during disinflation programs.
An important point to note is that the time period during which this
problem will persist is NOT the period during which prices are fixed, but the
time it takes for to fall to zero. This may be a substantially longer; in
high inflation countries prices will often be adjusted at high frequency, but
if information about government fiscal and monetary policy becomes available
only gradually, WEmayexceed WL and unemployment may remain high for a period
of time well in excess of the price setting period.
Fig. 3 can also be used to show what price controls can do to
alleviate this problem. Before we do so one prior point. In models like the
one presented here controls can also be used to permanently improve on the
full anticipation equilibrium, because the monopolistic competition market
structure results in socially suboptimal output levels in some states of
nature. A proper analysis of such a policy would however also need to take
into account the microeconomic costs such a policy would entail. The symmetry
assumptions made in this paper prevent a satisfactory analysis of 9uch costs
which are related to the relative price distortions controls unavoidably
introduce. We therefore do not consider their possible permanent use here but
impose that they are used for transitional purposes only.
1, KEYH (øj)= k/(l+WL/(YH(wfl_WL))).Simple differentiation establishes
the claims made in the text.SV—046/SVD/05—27—B7 — 19 —
Price controls take the pricing decision out of the firmst hands; in
terms of fig. 3 they rotate the K line (see fig. 4).21Thegovernment now
sets K, say at Kc. If Kc is set below the no—controls solution controls
will never bind; if is set above the LL line rotates down and expected
output increases because of the controls whenever they are binding. It is
clearly possible to set prices such that the full credibility solution is
reproduced: this involves setting K equal to KL, rotating the liquidity
constraint line as indicated in fig. 4. Transitional umemployment losses are
avoided when binding price controls are imposed in that manner, basically
because price controls allow a higher real money stock during the transition
period towards full credibility.
7Znn — __ —
I,
'1.'fl
Figure4: Output Effect, of Price Control.
1/ In fact they also shift the curve between the F and the Ii regime (see 2.11






Welfarewill clearly improve (see Appendix A.2 for proof):
uC(ch, c1) > U Price controls therefore increase welfare if credibility
problems cause transitional unemployment without such controls.
The argument for government intervention in the case of mistaken
beliefs has also been made by Calvo (1986). The nature of the welfare Losses
in his example is different, however. There consumers underestimate the true
intertemporal terms of trade because they mistakenly expect a trade reform to
be reversed. Hence too much expenditure is shifted towards today, and a wedge
opens up between the intertemporal terms of trade and the intertemporal rate
of substitution in consumption. The associated welfare costs are proportional
to the intertemporal substitution elasticity, in standard "Harberger triangle"
fashion. Mistaken beliefs do not lead to underutilization of resources
however, contrary to the example provided here. Finally, the result that
under monopolistic competition price controls incrase output also emerges in
the analysis of Helpman (1987), although not through the same mechanism.
Credibility plays no role in his paper.
4. Asset Prices, Intertemporal Inflation—Unemployment Trade Offs and the
Appropriate Conduct of Monetary Policy During Price Controls.
Asset prices depend crucially on firms' beliefs about government
policy in the next period, t÷1, and onwards. This can, for period t+l, again
be summarized in the parameter '4.'4 >in turn, will be based on prior
information as summarized iny, supplemented by any new information about
the government that has become available during period t. Clearly, the
particular way in which will be updated depends on the incentive structure
the government faces, the particular informational asymmetries that exist, and
so on.SV—046/SVD/ 05—27—87 —21—
Cheatingon announcements by announcing WL but implementingWH
leads to employment gains in period t; after all, prices were set based on the
expectation WE C w. However, since the same incentive problem arises next
period, firms will subsequently increase above and set next period's
prices accordingly. In that sense price controls lead to an intertemporaL
trade off between current unemployment and future inflation.
The informational asyruunetry arises because firms need to set prices
after monetary policy is announced, but before its realizationcan be
observed. This could lead to uncertainty about actual policy if firms have
incomplete information about the government's preferences. For example firms
could be uninformed about the government's rate of timepreference.A more
impatient government maybemore inclined to sacrifice future inflation for
current employment gains by cheating on its monetary policy announcements for
the price control period (?ersson and van Wijnbergen (1987)).
In such circumstances it is possible thatasignaling equilibrium
exists, as argued in Section 2.1; then would switch to zero or one
depending on whether w in the price controls period coincides with the
announced value or not. This is explored further in Persson and
van Wijnbergen (1987), and simply assumed here.
4.1 Interest Rates, Exchange Rates and the Stock Market During Disinflation
To determine the behaviour of asset prices during disinflation
controls consider first the marginal utility of wealth, A. Since both
expected monetary expansion and expectational errors influence A, we need to
distinguish the case where the government implements its announcement (w —
WL)
and the case where it cheats: w =
cu•Call the two cases L and H
respectively.I label the benchmark cases of full credibility at FCLY andSV—0461SVD/05—27—87 —22—
fullcredibility at FCH. Applying (2.12) yields the results given in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: MONETARY POLICY AND ThE MARGINAL UTILITY OF WEALTH DURING
A DISINFLATION PROGRAM
______________ L H ; FCL FCH
CAl W (ii Cd
BA•WE BAWE BA BA
Cd1 Cd










Because of credibility problems, an announced disinflation program that is
actually implemented raises the marginal utility of wealth: XL >
XFC
if )0.
The opposite happens if the government cheats on its announcement and actually
implements w11: XH <XFCH
<
1FCL
This has implications for both real interest rates and stock market
behaviour during the control period. Stock market valuation is inversely
proportional to the current marginal value of wealth: share prices give the
value of claims on future output in terms of current utility of wealth:
EA'(Q1 +Y')
A Bh/XSV—046/sVD/O5—27—87 —23—
Hencethe result that stockmarkets will be depressed during a disinflation
program that is actually implemented, but buoyant if the government cheats and
follows expansionary policies instead:
(4.7) > + = 3iY'r.. < BhIXfl=
Theintuition is straightforward: a high current marginal utility of wealth
lovers the relative value of future claims on output with respect to current
wealth and hence depresses the stock market. The reverse happens afteran
unanticipated monetary expansion, as when the government cheats on its
announcement and implements w instead.
A more conventional presentation draws on real interest behaviour.
Real rates equal the expected rate of decline in A (cf Section 2.2); Table
4.2 follows from (2.14) and Table 4.1.:












- Thisis an important result: during a disinflation program, real
interest rates will be high if the disinflationprogram is in fact
implemented, and low if the government cheats and plays
WEinstead.Note thatSV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —24—
thisis a more fundamental result than the often—heard claim that credibility
problems only raise ex—post but not ex—ante real rates, since inflationary
expectations exceed inflation. r is the return on an indexed bond, so
inflation surprises do not affect it. Cheating by implementing a more
expansionary policy than announced will thus lower the real interest rate and
shift consumption forward into the current period.
Consider next the nominal interest rate. This is non—trivial since
simple relations between real and nominal rates and inflation break down in
the presence of monetary policy uncertainty (Svensson (1985)). Applying the
asset pricing equ. 2.13a and Table 4.1 yields Table 4.3:
Table 4.3: NOMINAL INTEREST RATES DURING DISINFLATION




Table 4.3 shows that, contrary to real interest rates, nominal rates of
interest are not affected by credibility problems during the period of
controls. This is because current surprises in the level of the moneystock
affect the future price level, but this influences the future liquidity
service of money in the same way it affects the marginal utility of wealth.
Hence the relative attractiveness of money and bonds is not affected by such
surprises and hence neither is the nominal interest rate.
For similar reasons, the asset market exchange rate is not affected
by credibility problems either. The exchange rate results are straight
forward: expansionary policy leads to a depreciating rate, and tight policy







eli is the exchange rate under expansionary and eL the rate under tight policy.
The conmiodity market exchange rate will be affectedby credibility
problems and the associated tightening of liquidity constraints:
Uf'h 11fMtllaE (4.10) e . ——. **
Ub'P UbNWE
Clearly,credibility problems have £ direct impact on since they
raiseWE. In addition, for y > output and thus home consumption is equal
to what consumption would be in the case of disinflation withfull
credibility. Hence uh will not be affected for those realizations ofy.
However, with credibility problems liquidity constraintsstart binding
earlier: between and y home consumption in the no credibility case (NC)
falls short of what it is in the fullcredibility case (FC). Hence in that
NC FC region u. >uh; also C so even for y > withliquidity
constraints binding in both the NC and the FCcase, u will exceed u.
The resulting decline in demand for homegoods takes pressure off commodity
markets and off the goods market exchange rate. This willreduce the
depreciation credibility problems cause through their impacton expected money
growth cat. By how much depends on the degree ofcurvature of uh.SV—046/SVD/O5—27—87 —27—
Theresults are intuitive: if monetary policy does not deviate from its
announced values, with which the controls are compatible (u =wL)the
marginal utility of wealth equals what would obtain under a fully credible
implementation of Since price controls remedy the problem of a too low
real money stock on the transition path towards credibility, they alsoprevent
the high real interest rates that we showed characterize the no—controls
disinflation programs (see section 4.1 and tabLes 4.2 and 4.4). Hence an
important result: a disinflation program, combined with price controls set to
be compatible with the announced tight money policy, will work if the
restrictive policy is indeed followed. It will work in the sense that
mistaken beliefs will now not cause intertemporal distortions and the
associated high real interest rates and transitional output losses that
restrictive policies alone would cause in the presence of credibility
problems.
Cheating on the announcement (i.e. announcingWL and setting the
price controls accordingly, but implementing WH) would cause deviations from
the full credibility results. Table 4.4 shows that the resulting increase in
the real money stock during the transition period lowers X during that
period. Cheating will thus also cause a temporary fall in the real interest
rate (cf. table 4.4) and art increase in expected output. However, because of
the signaling function of actual monetary policy,ywillnow switch to one
and inflation in the post—control period becomes therefore unavoidable.
Cheating on the announcement—cum—controls package therefore indeed buys
current employment gains at the cost of future inflation losses.
The results are very different for nominal interest rates. As we saw
in section 4.1, current prices do not influence nominal interest rates (equ.
4.lb); the nominal interest rate equals the ratio between expected futureSV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —28—
liquidityservices and the expected utility of future nominal weaLth. Using
2.12 and 2.13b it becomes obvious that the results from table 4.3 apply
independent of the imposition of price controls. Price controls will affect
real interest rates, not nominal rates.
Consider finally exchange rates. Clearly price controls applying to
the goods market in period t will not affect the exchange rate obtaining while
the asset market operates afterwards. Thus, the results from the previous
section apply: expansionary policy during the control period set to one
(lead to expectations of future expansion) and hence the exchange rate will
fall (depreciate):
14 'a, 14 w
H t H t L L 4Li) e — > — tNcat' t
is the asset market exchange rate under expansionary policy, and e the
corresponding rate when policy is restrictive, i.e. in accordance with
announcements.
The commodity market exchange rate does depend on the imposition






IT14(lower compared to what would obtain without
them. But, by relaxing liquidity constraints, they also influence home goods
consumption and thus uh. The interesting region to look at is the region
above sincethere price controls do in fact affect output and consumption.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —29—
Thereare two offsetting effects:!" a direct effect through and
indirect one through uhs For y >
H
££ NiL (4.14) e
k
sothe net effect depends on the elasticity of uh. Controls raise IC so uh.K
viii rise or fall depending on whether c ><1.All diagrams in this paper
Ch
Uh have been drawn for the case of high intertemporal substitution, c >1;in
Ch
thatcase the controls lead to a higher exchange rate (more appreciated) than
would obtain without the controls for the same monetary policy and output








wherethe subscript NC refers to the no control case and C to the case of
price controls. Also, (4.14) shows that expansionary monetary policy during
the control period (WH) will depreciate the exchange rate one for one.
Since these rates are free market rates, their empirical counterpart
is probably the black market exchange rate. Expansionary policy during the
control period could therefore lead to a rising black market premium, while
controls with tight policy should lead to a fall in that premium.
!/ In fact there is a third effect: changes inch will in general also
affect uf. If the intertemporal substitution elasticity a exceeds the
intratemporal elasticity s, this spillover is positive and vice versa.
(See Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1987) for a discussion). We will assume
as in our exchange rate discussion, thus eliminating such
international spillover effects.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —30—
5.Conclusions
The notion of price inertia naturally leads to an imperfect
competition framework. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between
lack of credibility of government policy announcements and the price setting
behavior of forward looking firms in monopolistic competition. We show that
this interaction can lead to inflation inertia extending well beyond the price
setting period. The latter is important, because the price setting period is
likely to be short in highly inflationary economies.
We do this within the framework of an open economy macro model in
which firms have to set prices before uncertainty about government policy is
resolved. This model is used to analyze the precise nature of output losses
during a monetary stabilization program, and the potential role for price
controls in avoiding them. We show that with full credibility, the monetary
disinflation will not cause output losses, in spite of price setting by
firms. If firms, assign a positive probability to the government not
implementing its announcements, however, output losses will arise. The basic
problem is straightforward: lack of credibility causes the real money stock to
be "too low" on the transition path between the policy announcement and the
period in which government credibility will finally be established. It is the
interaction between monopolistic price setting and credibility that causes the
output losses during disinflation programs.
If the government does not renege on its announcements, money will be
lower than anticipated, and hence the real money stock too tight. The ensuing
tightening of liquidity constraints lowers consumption and raises the marginal
utility of wealth. This effect dies away as credibility improves and the gapSV—046/SvD/O5—21—87 —31—
betweenactual and anticipated money disappears (in this paper the information
structure is set up such that that only takes one period). The temporary
impact on the marginal utility of wealth also explains the behavior of asset
prices during the transition period. The stock market valuation of home firms
measures the value of claims on future output plus future resale value in
terms of current marginal utility of wealth; hence the result that stock
markets will be depressed during a disinflation program that is incompletely
believed but actually implemented. Similarly, real interest rates will be
high during a disinflation program plagued by credibility problems but
actually implemented. The real interest rate on an indexed bond equals the
rate at which the marginal utility of a real unit of wealth, A, declines over
time; thus a declining A impLies a high real rate of interest. This is a
more fundamental result than the often heard claim that credibility problems
raise the ex—post real rate but not the ex—ante one, because inflationary
expectations are higher than actual inflation. But we have derived the result
for an indexed bond, which is not affected by such inflation surprises.
We finally discuss nominal interest rates and the exchange rate.
Nominal interest rates are not affected by surprises in the level of themoney
stock: the nominal interest rate equals the ratio between the value of future
liquidity services of money and the marginal utility of a future unit of
nominal wealth, and a money stock level surprise affects both the in the same
way. Thus there is no impact of credibility problems on nominal rates. They
will be high when actual monetary policy is expansionary and low when it is
not, irrespective of credibility problems.
For a similar reason, there will be no impact of credibility problems
per se on asset markets exchange rates (i.e. the relative price of a unit ofSV—046/SVIJ/05—27—87 —32—
foreignand domestic currency traded when asset marketsare open).
Expansionary policy will depreciate the exchange rare, andcontractionary
policy appreciate it, irrespective of credibility problems. This isnot the
case with the commodity market exchange rate however. The latter isthe rate
that would obtain during the timecommodity markets are open if there were
continuous trading in home and foreigncurrency. We show that for that
exchange rate concept, the rate will appreciate because ofcredibility
problems for those output realizations where liquidity constraintsbecome
binding.
All these intratemporal and intertemporal relativeprice effects
carry true economic welfare losses; they cause wedges between rates of
substitution and terms of trade available incommodity and asset markets.
Price controls avoid these problemsby taking the pricing decisions out of the
firms' hands. Thus anticipations ofreneging on tight money announcements
will not be passed on in prices that willthen be too high if the government
in fact does not renege. Asa consequence there will be no output losses
during a disinflation program with properly administeredprice controls, and
no increase in the marginal utility of wealth,credibility problems
notwitstanding. Hence high real interest rates will be avoided.
However, we also show the importance of restrictive policiesduring
the price control period. If price controlsare compatible with the announced
monetary disinflation program, and actual monetary policy doesnot deviate
from its announced values, the relativeprice distortions mentioned are
avoided, but exploiting price controls to relaxmonetary policy beyond its
announced values reintroduces them.Moreoever, we show that if current actual
monetary policy has any information content about futuremonetary policy,SV—046/SV0f05—27—87 —33—
expansionarymonetary policy during the price controL period Leads to the same
anticipatory price setting problems after the control period that these
controls were designed to resolve. In that sense, credibility and price
controls together introduce an intertemporal trade off between current
employment gains and future inflationary costs. Sustaining low inflation
beyond the period of price controls thus requires restrictive monetary policy
during the price control period.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —34—
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APPENDIXA:
A.l Derivation of the Equilibrium Equations
We consider a perfectly pooled equilibrium, where the home and
foreign consumer hold identical portfolios and consume identical quantities of
the goods. That is, they hold the same per capita share of world asset stocks
and consume the same per capita share of world output of each good: haLf of
world quantities. Then the market equilibrium condition for the goods, money
and other asset markets can be written
-(A.la) Cht = =￿ and cf =c;t
=￿
(A.lb) l4 = = andN = N: =N,and
(A.lc)
ZhZf =z=;= 1Mt= XNt = 1.
Introduce the notation
(A.2) x = x, x_1 = x_1, x' =





Thenthe budget, liquidity and rationing constraints can be rewritten
(A.2a) ch + Pcf + ¶MN
+
UNN+ qz + qf1f + rMXM + rNxN Sw,SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —37—
(A.2b) w'=
irM
+ + + 3h +pY')Zf
+
+ [r4+iv' (w' _1)i&M+[r'+
(A.2c) Ch sivM[M_l+ (w_l)ii_lxM_l],
(A.2d) PCf S N—l + (wt—l)t1x.1],
(A.2e) Ch S Y and
(A.2f)
CfSY.
In a stationary stochastic rational expectationsequilibrium the endogenous
variables in period t will be functions of the-state variables inperiod t,
(sW_1,i1,M,t).Then the home consumer's decision problem to maximize
(2.4) subject to (A.2) defines, in the usualway, the value function
as the maximumofu(ch,cf) +
BE[v(w MNx,f,xN,s l1tiiTitw )]subjectto (8.2). The first—order
conditions together with the market equilibrium conditions (2.9),give
(A.3a)
ch WHIt1 ￿ 0],
(A.4a)
PCf S N [J'f ￿ 0]
(A.3b) y Nh 01,
(A.4b) Cf Sy* (Vf ￿ 01,SV—046/SVD/O5—27—87 —38—
















HereA, u, lsf Vand are Lagrange multipliers of the constrains (A.2a),
(A.2c), (A.2d), (A.2e) and (4.21), respectively. Equations (A.Sc) —(A.3f)
are the partials of the Lagrangean with respect toch K, Zh, and
whereas (A.4c) —(A.4f) are partials with respect tocf, N, Zf and ZN. By the
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whichhas been exploited in (A.3) and (A.4).
Equations (A.3a) —(A.3d),together with the pricing equation (2.9),
give (2.lla) —(2.lld).
A.2 Welfare During Disinflation ?rograms with and without Price Controls.
uC is period t welfare during a disinflationprogram with price
controls in place; uE is the game but for the case without price controls. In
both cases credibility is an issue: >0.
FCKLWL)












+ .f(u(y,c )— u(Kw ,c))dFdFt dH*
F(KEwL)
F(y)




(A) + f (u (y ,Cf) —u(KEwL




(B) + f (u (K_Lw ,c)— u(Kw ,c1) dF dF* dH*
F(KLWL)
> CuE
The inequality obtains since, for y > KEWL, u (y, C) > u(KEaL, C1) and since
> KEwL.SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —41—
APPENDIXB: The Price Setting Problem
We consider a continuum of firms defined over the unitinterval, each
producing a unique differentiated good indexed by j, 0 Sj￿ 1. Home
preferences for differentiated goods are describedby a CES subutility
function separable in the home and foreignaggregates with corresponding CES





Actual output is the minimum of capacity and demand:
(3.2) Y. =mmCy, Chi).
The home currency stock market value of firm h is:
(3.3) hJ =9E(A'it(ç+ P.11)1 ATM




Consider first the case where the firm actually knows that a will
equal say w. Then (2.20) can be written as:SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —42—






The expression between parentheses equals Ey'. Equation (2.21) immediately
shows one important result: if w' is known in advance, expected output
depends on Kw', but not on w'. Maximizing the stock market valuation




WE üEap. F(Kw')hj h E
S
Simple manipulation of (2.22) shows that firms set the price such that the
elasticity of demand equaLs minus one. The price influences that elasticity
because it determines the probability of excess capacity. Without excess
capacity, the elasticity is zero; with excess capacity it equals the
first order condition, once syuinetry across firms has been imposed, impliesa







Considernext the case of policy uncertainty. We take a simple case,
in anticipation of the analysis of disinflationprograms in the next
section: monetary expansion can be either high or low and the firm attaches
probability ytothe possibility of an expansionary monetary policy:
(8.8) Pr(w' = = Pr(w'=
WL)SV—046/SVD/05—27—87 —43—
Inappendix C we show that, for a uniform distribution ofy over the interval
(o, ),firmswillset prices as if =
TR(LIH+ (lYH)L obtains with
certainty. Therefore, for this particular demandstructure, policy
uncertainty itself does not affect the probability of unemployment:
F(y) F(y) fly)
(8.9) JdF=y fdF+(1y)f dF
F(yH) F(y)
and are the output realization levels at which the liquidity constraints
become binding in the restrictive(WL) and expansionary (w11) case
respectively (cf.figure 1 in section 2.3).SV—046/svD/05—27—87 — 44 —
APPENDIXC: Monetary Policy Uncertainty, Price Setting and Unemployment
Define Ks as the value of K for which the firm's first order








By construction,WE equals the expected value of W in the monetary
uncertainty case:
(c.2) W5 H W + WL
The FO condition in the uncertainty case thenequals:
fly) 1H F(y)
f KwdF+ Kw dF
ca F(Kw) LF(Kw)
ii W L
Iwill show that for a uniform distribution ofy over (Y, y), ItE
satisfies C.). It wilt be convenient toreproduce figure C.l.










Similar simplification is possible forthe uncertainty case. The numerator of










(c.2):(us =1+ (1—i)WLP and
(c.3): a uniform distribution ofy over (y, ).Iwill assume





(C.6) (c.1—3)a F(KEWE) =
THF(KEWH) +— ''HF(KEWL)
Hence the numerator of C.4 equals N.C3 under those conditions. Therefore, X
solves the FO conditions for the uncertainty case too, given (c.1—3), if
(C7)
1
WE E E E H L








= ____ + XE(F()
=
XE(1/2+— KW5)/y)












(1/2 +( — KEWH)/y)SV—046/sv1J/05—27—87 —47—
Similarlyfor the restrictive money realization:
(1—y ) 1_IF(1Cw) 1 F(y)
L
WL 0 WL
= (1111)KE (1/2 +(KEwL))
Adding (8.9) and (8.10), and using (b.2), thenyields:
=
TH1E (1/2 +- 1EWH)/Y)
+ KE (1/2 +(;: —
(c.l1) =
KE(1/2 +6;— Kw)/y)
Hence LHS= RHSand solves the FOC of the firm in themonetary uncertainty
case too. Given (c.l—3) therefore, the existence ofpolicy uncertainty does
not in itself affect the probability ofunemployment.